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NOTES
CONSIDERATION OF TAX ASPECTS IN AWARDING
DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES
The recent decision of the House of Lords, in British Transport
Commission v. Gourley1 has completely changed the English position
on the question of whether income taxes should be considered in
determining personal injury damages based on actual or prospective
loss of earnings. The House of Lords held that the lower court should
have taken the tax aspects into account and that the damage award
must be reduced accordingly. By this holding, the House of Lords
2
overruled Jordan v. The Limmer And Trinidad Lake Asphalt Co.
3
and Billingham v. Hughes, which until then represented the ruling
law in England on the subject.
The part income taxes play in determining damages for loss of
-earnings is a question of real importance in view of the present income
tax rates and the high scale of personal injury awards, plus the fact
that beginning with the Revenue Act of 19184 personal injury damage
awards have been expressly excluded from gross income under the
United States Internal Revenue Code.
Surprisingly enough, there are relatively few cases in which the
problem has been at issue. The first English case in which the matter
arose was decided in 1933. 5 The question has been decided, with con6
flicting results by only two American state supreme courts.
In the first reported English case, Fairholmev. Firth & Brown Ltd.,7
an employee had been wrongfully dismissed and the court had to
decide whether the employee's liability for income tax and surtax on
his salary8 was a factor to be considered in assessing his damages. The
court answered in the negative on the ground that the incidence and
extent of the income tax are matters between the Crown and the taxpayer, and are of no concern to the wrongdoer. While "Parliament
might have provided, and may still provide, that sums awarded as
compensation for loss of income shall themselves be subject to taxa1. [1956] 2 Weekly L.R. 41 (H.L.) (Lord Keith of Avonholm dissenting).
2. [1946] K.B. 356.
3. [1949] 1 K.B. 643 (C.A.), 9 A.L.R. 2d 320 (1950).
4. Revenue Act of 1918, § 213 (b) (2), 40 STAT. 1057 (1919).
5. Fairholme v. Firth & Brown Ltd., 149 L.T.R. (n.s.) 332 (K.B. 1933).
6. Hall v. Chicago & N.W.Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955), reversing

349 Ill. App. 175, 110 N.E.2d 654 (1953); Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339,
251 S.W.2d 42 (1952), reversing 360 Mo. 177, 227 S.W.2d 675 (1950).
7. 149 L.T.R. (n.s.) 332 (K.B.1933).
8. An award reimbursing lost wages caused by wrongful dismissal would
constitute taxable income under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61 (a).
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tion," 9 this was a matter for the Inland Revenue authorities to decide
and was outside the province of the court. This principle of res inter
alios acta was the backbone of the English, Scottish and Canadian
cases 10 prior to the decision in the British Transport case.1 1
Several English, Scottish and Canadian cases in the period between
1946 and 1947 passed on whether income taxes should be deducted in
fixing personal injury awards. Jordan v. The Limmer And Trinidad
Lake Asphalt Co. involved damages for accrued loss of wages only;
future wages were not involved. The court followed the Fairholme
decision and held that even where plaintiff's wages were subject to
withholding taxes, to be deducted by the defendant, such taxes were
not to be regarded in assessing damages; the sum awarded must be
the full rate of wages obtained in the employment and not "takehome" pay.12 It does not appear that M'Daid v. The Trustees of the
Clyde Navigation 3 was called to the court's attention. M'Daid was a
Scottish case of the same year in which the injured workman was
customarily paid a weekly wage from which P.A.Y.E. taxes were
deducted. Lord Sorn decided that in awarding damages for loss of
earnings, a judge should consider the net sum which was paid to the
injured workman after the payment of the tax rather than merely the
gross sum which the workman earned. It should be noted, however,
that in reaching this decision Lord Sorn's attention was not directed
to the Fairholme case. Blackwood v. Andre, 14 decided one year later,
expressly repudiated the M'Daid rule; Lord Keith, who was the one
dissenting judge in the British Transport case, held that no deduction
for income tax liability should be made from the amount awarded
for loss of earnings. 15
In 1949, the English Court of Appeal dealt with the question for the
first time in Billingham v. Hughes and approved the Fairholme and
Jordan holdings. Lord Singleton stated: "The practice in the courts
of this country has consistently been not to have regard to income tax
in the assessment of damages; and to alter the practice now would
lead to great confusion, and would add immeasurably to the difficulty
9. Fairholme v. Firth & Brown Ltd., 149 L.T.R. (n.s.) 332, 333 (K.B. 1933).
10. Jordan v. The Limmer And Trinidad Lake Asphalt Co., [1946] K.B.
356; Blackwood v. Andre, [1947] Sess. Cas. 333 (Scot.); Bowers v. Hollinger
& Co., [1946] Ont. 526, 4 D.L.R. 186; Fine v. Toronto Transp. Comm'n
[1945] Ont. W.N. 901, 1 D.L.R. 221.
11. The theory is repudiated by Lord Goddard and Lord Reid in British
Transp. Comm'n v. Gourley, [1956] 2 Weekly L.R. 41 (H.L.).

12. Atkinson, J., stated that even though Fairholme was decided before
the existence of the regulation allowing a withholding tax, he felt its
principles still applied.
13. [1946] Sess. Cas. 462 (Scot.).
14. [1947] Sess. Cas. 333 (Scot.).
15. Davies v. Adelaide Chemical and Fertilizer Co., [1947] S.A.S.R. 67

(S. Austr.), followed the Fairholmeand Jordandecisions; as did the Canadian

cases of Bowers v. Hollinger & Co., [1946] Ont. 526, 4 D.L.R. 186; and Fine v.
Toronto Transp. Comm'n, [1945] Ont. W. N. 901, [1946] 1 D.L.R. 221.

1956 ]

NOTES

of assessing damages and in the direction to be given to a jury.' 16
The Billingham case remained the law of England until the British
17
Transport case reversed it.
The early American cases tended to be in accord in result at least
with the English cases culminating in the Billingham decision. However, a different basis for the rulings was utilized. The ratio decidendi
of the American courts in shying away from a contemplation of the
income tax aspects of personal injury damage awards was that such
factors are too conjectural for consideration.' 8 This theory has continued to appear throughout the later United States cases.
For example, in Smith v. PennsylvaniaR.R.,19 an action for wrongful
death, the court stated: "[W] e hold that it is not proper to deduct from
the annual income of plaintiff's decedent Federal Income Taxes in determining the amount which the decedent would have contributed to
his wife and children had he lived. Such taxes are too speculative to
be considered by the jury. '20 While the Court of Appeals' opinion in
Southern Pacific Co. v. Guthrie2' contained language favorable to the
deduction of tax liability, this was contradicted on the rehearing two
years later when the court said: "[W] e think the court's view that the
net take home pay, after taxes, would represent the actual loss is correct; but we are now convinced that we cannot tell how much this
would be."22
Outside of the dictum contained in Cole v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0.
Ry. 23 indicating that taxes (among many other items) should be considered in arriving at damages for personal injuries, it was not until
1951 that the gradual divergence in the American opinions regarding
the propriety of considering tax liability began to make itself noticed.
In that year, in the dissenting opinion to the memorandum decision on
petition for rehearing of Sunray Oil Corp. v. Altbritton,24 and in
DeVito v. United Air Lines,25 it was assumed that income taxes were
a valid part of the procedure for arriving at damage awards. In
neither case, however, did the court give any reasons for this assumption.
16. [1949] 1 K.B. at 652.
17.

Lord Tucker, one of the judges participating in the Billingham ruling,

was of the majority in the contrary British Transport decision rendered six
years later.

18. Stokes v. United States, 144 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944); Chicago & N.W. Ry.

v. Curl, 178 F.2d 497 (8th Cir. 1949). The conjectural nature of future
income taxes has also been discussed in gift tax cases. See, e.g., Sarah Helen
Harrison, 17 T.C. 1350 (1952).
19. 59 Ohio L. Abs. 282, 99 N.E.2d 501 (1950).
20. Id., 99 N.E.2d at 504.
21. 180 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1949), rehearing, 186 F.2d 926 (9th Cdir.), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 904 (1951).
22. 186 F.2d at 927.

23. 59 F. Supp. 443, 445 (D. Minn. 1945) (dictum).
24. 188. F. 2d 751, 752 (5th Cir. 1951) (dissenting opinion).
25. 98 F. Supp.88 (E.D.N.Y. 1951).
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The 1952 Missouri Supreme Court decision in Dempsey v. Thompson 26
is one of the leading decisions in the field. The Missouri court overruled its decision in Hilton v. Thompson 7 that a defendant's request
for jury instruction regarding freedom of damage awards from income
taxes was properly refused. The court held that while the trial judge
in the case before it did not err either in refusing to permit defendant
to cross-examine plaintiff's actuarial witness relative to income tax
liability28 or in refusing to permit the defendant to argue to the jury
that in arriving at the amount of their award they should consider
only the amount of future earnings lost to the plaintiff after deduction
of income taxes, "it does not follow that defendant was not entitled to
have the jury instructed that any amount awarded plaintiff is not
subject to Federal or State income tax."29 This instruction was favored
as a means of preventing an enhanced award to the plaintiff through a
-possible "misconception on the part of a jury that the amount allowed
by it will be reduced by income taxes." 30
The cases decided after Dempsey are few in number. Maus v. New
York, Chicago & St. L.R.R. would continue the American trend of
allowing no instruction to the jury.31 Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Pool32 in
dictum indicated that while deductions for income taxes are too
conjectural for consideration, the court would follow the Dempsey
view that the defendant upon request is entitled to an instruction that
no amount awarded plaintiff would be subject to federal income tax.
Hall v. Chicago & North Western Ry. 33 established the definite split
among American jurisdictions. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected
the Missouri Supreme Court ruling in the Dempsey case and adopted
the position represented by Hilton v. Thompson, which Dempsey had
overruled. "The incident of taxation is not a proper function for a
jury's consideration, imparted either by oral argument or written
26. 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952), reversing 360 Mo. 177, 227 S.W.2d
675 (1950).
27. 360 Mo. 177, 227 S.W.2d 675 (1950).
28. Cf. Rouse v. New York, C. & St. L.R.R., 349 Ill. App. 139, 110 X.E.2d
266 (1953).
29. 251 S.W.2d at 45 (the court made this ruling prospective only, as it
considered the instruction refused in the lower court to be merely a "cautionary" one, within the discretion of the trial court, and felt that other
instruction to the jury had been sufficient). The Appellate Court of Indiana
in dealing with the question as one of first impression in Highshew v. Kushto,
131 N.E.2d 652 (Ind. App. 1956), approved the instruction contained in this
prospective ruling.
30. 251 S.W.2d at 45.

31. 128 N.E.2d 166 (Ohio App. 1955). "The result of several such inquiries
would so complicate the trial of a personal injury action into an intricate
discussion of tax and nontax liabilities, and so confuse the ordinary jury with
technical tax questions as to defeat the purpose of a trial." 128 N.E.2d at 167.
See also Pfister v. City of Cleveland, 113 N.E.2d 366, 368 (Ohio App. 1953)
(dictum).
32. 263 S.W.2d 582, 592 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) (dictum).
33. 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955), reversing 349 Ill. App. 175, 110
N.E.2d 654 (1953.
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It introduces an extraneous subject giving rise to con-

jecture and speculation."''
Thus the American decisions at the present time have resolved into
two positions: (1) the jury should not be instructed with respect to
the tax status of any personal injury compensation;5 (2) while deductions for income taxes are too conjectural for consideration by a
jury, the defendant on request is entitled to an instruction that any
amount awarded plaintiff would not be subject to federal taxation.3
The present English view represented by British Transport,of course,
goes much farther than the second American rule and allows the jury
to consider all the income tax consequences of the particular award.
The courts have said that it is impossible to assert with mathematical
precision what deductions should be made and that the determination
of the income tax factor in setting damages involving loss of wages
is too speculative for the judge or jury.3 7 But is such a determination
any more difficult than guessing how long and to what extent the
plaintiff will be disabled, what the future wage rate will be, what the
labor market will be, or what unemployment compensation will be?
Certainly it seems clear that the argument of difficulty in ascertaining
the proper deductions for income taxes should not apply to wages lost
prior to the verdict. Further, it is questionable whether this is a valid
argument with regard to estimated future wages, in yiew of the speculative matters which juries have been instructed to consider in related
fields such as the taxing of alimony awards, the reduction of damages
to present worth, and the reflection in damage awards of the current
purchasing power of the dollar.
The matter of income tax as a factor in the fixing or adjustment of
maintenance awards to a divorced wife has been considered in both
English and American cases. 38 In Phillips v. Phillips, it was stated
that while the courts may not readjust a tax burden in a way not
intended by Congress, still "any decrease in the wife's net income
because of taxes or any other reason may be considered in fixing the
34. Id., 125 N.E.2d at 86; accord, Combs v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry.,
135 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Iowa 1955); Wagner v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 7 Ill. App.
2d 445, 129 N.E.2d 771 (1955).

35. Upheld by decisions of the following courts: The United States District
Court for the Northern District of Iowa; Ohio Appeals; Illinois Supreme

Court; Appellate Court of Illinois.
36. Approved by decisions of the following courts: Indiana Appellate Court;
Missouri Supreme Court; Texas Civil Appeals Court.
37. Margevich v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 1 Ill. App. 2d 162, 116 N.E.2d 914
(1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 861 (1954); Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339,
251 S.W.2d 42 (1952), reversing 360 Mo. 177, 227 S.W.2d 675 (1950); Maus v.
New York, Chicago & St. L. R.R., 128 N.E.2d 166 (Ohio App. 1955); Pfister v.
City of Cleveland, 113 N.E.2d 366 (Ohio App. 1953); Billingham v. Hughes,
[19491 1 K.B. 643 (C.A.); Fairholme v. Firth & Brown Ltd., 149 L.T.R. (n.s.)
332 (K.B. 1933).
38. See Annot., 153 AL.R. 1041 (1944).
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amount of her alimony."39 The New York case of Burden v. Burden40
allowed an increase in the alimony allowance to the wife for the
reason that she must pay income taxes thereon. Taxes on alimony
payments do, of course, differ from those involved in estimated future
income. First, there is no specific exclusion by the income tax law of
alimony awards other than those which qualify as lump sum payments. 41 Second, the alimony award in which taxes are included may
be reopened and adjusted from time to time as circumstances change.
A jury instruction to use the present purchasing power of the dollar
when measuring personal injury damages was held proper in Burke
v. San Francisco.42 The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Dabareiner v.
Weisflog 43 upheld a similar instruction, and many courts have held that
the trial judge may judicially notice a material decrease in the purchasing power of the dollar.44 Again, however, differences must be
noted between a determination by a jury of the income taxes involved
in estimated future income and the adjustment of an award by the
jury to reflect the present purchasing power of the dollar: the former
vary with each case and in each case are conjectural; but the present
purchasing power of the dollar is fixed at a definite percentage for all
cases decided at a certain time.
In England and Canada injured persons are permitted to recover the
aggregate of lost future earnings without reduction to their present
worth. In the Uiited States, however, the principle of reduction of
such damages to their present value is generally recognized 45 on the
basis that a person normally does not receive all of his future earnings
in a lump sum, but periodically over a number of years. Annuity
tables are used to show present worth.46 It must be recognized, of
course, that the problem of reducing damages to present worth and
that of estimating income taxes present different aspects. In reducing
awards to present worth there are no individual variances to be
considered; the process of reduction is the same for each case. Contrarily, in the determination of income taxes one of the main problems
39. 219 S.W.2d 249, 273 (Mo. App. 1949).

40. 48 N.Y.S.2d 859 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
41. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 71 (C) (1).

42. 244 P.2d 708 (Cal. App. 1952).

43. 253 Wis. 23, 33 N.W.2d 220, 12 A.L.R.2d 605 (1948); accord, Burlington

Transp. Co. v. Stoltz, 191 F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1951). But see dissent in Halloran
v. New England Tel. &Tel. Co., 95 Vt. 273, 115 Atl. 143, 145 (1921) (advocating

there be no consideration of decrease in money value).
44. E.g., Kircher v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 32 Cal. 2d 176, 195 P.2d 427

(1948); Eichten v. Central Minnesota Cooperative Power Ass'n, 224 Minn.
180, 28 N.W.2d 862 (1947); Van Cleave v. Lynch, 109 Utah 149, 166 P.2d 244
(1946).
45. Snyder v. General Elec. Co., 287 P.2d 108 (Wash. 1955); Prager,
Computation of Damages in PersonalInjury Cases, 4 KAN. L. REV. 91 (1955).
46. Annuity tables show the cost of an annuity which will produce an
income of $1.00 per year and be exhausted at the end of the annuitant's
expected life.
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is that of adequately considering the individual variances which in
fairness require computation.
It is true that any minute consideration by the jury of the individual
tax position of the plaintiff would necessarily be impossible. The
income tax is premised on allowing the taxpayer to subtract from his
gross income certain deductions which will result in a lower net
taxable income. A jury could make no allowance for these personal
deductions. They could not take into consideration that the amount
of tax payable by a taxpayer depends upon a number of other circumstances; for example, the extent of the taxpayer's own private
fortune, the separate income of his wife if he is married, the number
of his children and other dependents. 47 They could not take into consideration the long-range plans plaintiff may have to maintain or increase insurance premiums on life and endowment policies, to purchase tax-free stocks for investment purpose, or to make nontaxable
contributions to charitable institutions.
But to allow no instruction at all on the income tax aspects may result
in an excessive award to the plaintiff through a misconception on
the part of the jury. There is no reason to believe that jurors will
usually be familiar with the provision of the Internal Revenue Code
which frees personal injury awards from taxation, and in discussion
within the jury room it is not unlikely that some juror may suggest
the possibility that the award may be subject to taxes and, therefore,
should be increased accordingly.
In the final analysis, it would seem that the legislative intent to
exempt the entire personal injury award from taxation for policy
reasons,48 as expressed in section 104(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code, 49 is the stumbling block to any American adoption of the
British Transport rule allowing consideration of the income tax consequences of a particular award. The House of Lords in reversing the
English trend on this issue, was confronted only with case law on the
subject and was not faced with an Inland Revenue provision to the
contrary. The American courts, however, are faced with the fact that
Congress specifically excluded personal injury awards from taxation,
and it is hard to reconcile with section 104 (a) a reduction of awards
47. Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952),

reversing

360 Mo. 177, 227 S.W.2d 675 (1950); Fairholme v. Firth & Brown Ltd., 149
L.T.R. (n.s.) 332 (K.B. 1933).

48. Similar exclusions have been made by Congress in the INT. REV. CODE OF

1954 to cover: workmen's compensation, § 105; insurance proceeds, § 101;
gifts & inheritances, § 102; bad debt recoveries, § 111.
49. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 104, provides:

"(a) In General-Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not
in excess of) deductions allowed under section 213 (relating to
"(2)

medical, etc., expenses) for any prior taxable year, gross income does
not includethe amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement)
on acount of personal injuries or sickness."

